Elliptic curves over finite fields F 2 n play a prominent role in modern cryptography. Published quantum algorithms dealing with such curves build on a short Weierstrass form in combination with affine or projective coordinates. In this paper we show that changing the curve representation allows a substantial reduction in the number of T -gates needed to implement the curve arithmetic. As a tool, we present a quantum circuit for computing multiplicative inverses in F 2 n in depth O(n log n) using a polynomial basis representation, which may be of independent interest.
Introduction
Binary elliptic curves form an especially important family of groups for cryptographic applications, and the implementation of their addition law in a quantum circuit has been studied by a number of authors [11, 13] . To the best of our knowledge, in all these discussions the representation used for elliptic curves is a short Weierstrass form in combination with affine or projective coordinates. While this is a natural choice, restricting to such representations does not exploit the available technical machinery-there is a substantial body of work on how to optimize elliptic curve arithmetic on classical hardware architectures (cf. [4] ), and one may hope that some of these classical results allow for simplification at the circuit level when implementing binary elliptic curve arithmetic in a quantum circuit, e. g., when trying to find discrete logarithms [21] . For an actual implementation, the number of T -gates needed to implement such a circuit is particularly of interest and it is desirable to keep this number as small as possible. The reason for this is that for most fault-tolerant quantum computing schemes, the implementation of T -gates is achieved via so-called magic state distillation [6, 7, 18] , a process which is costly in terms of physical resources required. For instance, in the case of the surface code, it is reasonable to assume that a single T -gate has a cost that is about 100 times higher than a single CNOT [7] . While minimizing the total number of T -gates is the Inversion: Given α ∈ F * 2 n , find α −1 ∈ F 2 n .
The specific cost of each operation depends on how the field F 2 n is represented, and in the next two sections we look at three representations that have been considered in the literature on quantum circuits.
Polynomial basis representation
In a polynomial basis representation, F 2 n is identified with a quotient F 2 [x]/(f ) where f ∈ F 2 [x] is an irreducible polynomial of degree n. Each α ∈ F 2 n is represented by the unique sequence (α 0 , . . . , α n−1 ) ∈ F n 2 with α = n−1 i=0 x i + (f ). In a quantum circuit, we store each coefficient α i in a separate qubit. Quantum arithmetic in such a representation has been explored by a number of authors, including Beauregard et al. [3] , Kaye and Zalka [11] , and Maslov et al. [13] . For each of the four basic tasks mentioned above, the exact implementation complexity varies depending on the particular choice of f and efficient circuits are available:
Addition: As addition is defined coefficient-wise, n CNOT gates are sufficient to derive the representation of α + β from those of α and β. These gates operate on disjoint wires and can be implemented in depth 1. To realize an addition |α |β |0 →|α |β |α + β where the sum is stored in a separate register, we can first add |α to |0 , followed by adding |β , i. e., 2n CNOT gates and depth 2 suffice. In particular, we do not need a single T -gate to implement F 2 n -addition.
Multiplication:
Building on a classical Mastrovito multiplier [15, 16, 19] , in [13] a linear depth quantum circuit is presented which derives the product α · β from α, β ∈ F 2 n . This circuit requires n 2 Toffoli gates and n 2 − 1 CNOT gates. In particular, the T -gate complexity of a full F 2 n -multiplication is quite substantial. 1
Multiplication with a constant: Fix γ ∈ F * 2 n . As multiplication with γ is F 2 -linear, invoking a general multiplier is not necessary. Instead, we can realize multiplication by γ as a matrix-vector multiplication with a suitable non-singular matrix Γ. An LU P -decomposition of Γ immediately yields a depth 2n circuit that is comprised of no more than n 2 + n CNOTs. No Toffoli gates are needed.
Squaring:
No dedicated quantum circuit to implement the squaring map | α | 0 →| α | α 2 has been proposed, but as squaring in F 2 n is F 2 -linear, it is enough to implement a matrix-vector multiplication in depth 2n using no more than n · (n + 1) = n 2 + n CNOTs. No Toffoli gates are needed.
Summarizing, among the above mentioned four basic operations, only the general multiplication involves T -gates, and their number unfortunately grows quadratic in the extension degree n. In cryptographic applications of elliptic curves, values of n ≥ 160 are common. Hence, if we can save a general F 2 n -multiplication at the expense of some additions, squarings or constant multiplications, this can be of great value for the implementor of a quantum circuit. So far, our discussion has ignored the inversion operation. The current literature offers only a circuit with a cubic number of gates and quadratic depth [11] , making the two representations discussed in the next section seemingly more attractive for inversion. However, in Section 2.3 below, we will show that both the cubic gate complexity and the quadratic depth of this operation can be avoided by adapating the inversion technique used in [1] to the polynomial basis setting.
Gaussian normal basis and ghost-bit basis representations
Aiming for a more efficient inversion algorithm, in [1] two field representations are considered that differ from the polynomial basis representation just discussed: a ghost-bit basis and a Gaussian normal basis representation. For the purposes of this paper it is not necessary to discuss their technical details, and we restrict to looking at the cost of the relevant arithmetic operations:
Addition: With a Gaussian normal basis, addition can be performed in the same way as with a polynomial basis. If a ghost-bit basis is available, elements in F 2 n are represented with n + 1 bits, resulting again in two approaches for the addition. One approach is to add |α to |β yielding one additional CNOT gate and a depth 1 circuit. The other approach is to add |α followed by |β to |0 yielding two additional CNOT gates and a depth 2 circuit. Apart from these details, the addition operation is exactly the same as when using a polynomial basis representation.
Multiplication:
If a ghost-bit basis is available, the multiplication α · β of two field elements α, β ∈ F 2 n can be realized in depth n + 1 using (n + 1) 2 Toffoli gates.
With a Gaussian normal basis of type t, a quantum circuit of depth (t + (t mod 2)) · n − 1 involving (t + (t mod 2)) · n 2 − n Toffoli gates is available for multiplying two elements in F 2 n .
Multiplication with a constant:
Choosing the matrix Γ in accordance with the Gaussian normal basis or the ghost-bit basis, we can proceed as in the case of a polynomial basis. For a Gaussian normal basis this yields a circuit with n 2 + n CNOTs, and as a result of the extra bit used in a ghost-bit basis, for the latter we obtain a quantum circuit comprised of (n + 1) · (n + 2) = n 2 + 3n + 2 CNOT gates. No Toffolis are needed.
Squaring: This operation is for free since the square of a field element can be obtained by simply reading the coefficient vector in permuted order. Hence, no gates are required to implement the squaring operation and we require n respectively n + 1 CNOTs, all operating in parallel, to implement the map |α |0 →|α |α 2 , .
Again, in terms of T -gate complexity, multiplication is the dominating operation, and the number of squaring operations in formulae for fast elliptic curve addition can be expected to be quite small. Consequently, using a polynomial basis representation looks preferable, even if the particular extension degree of interest affords a Gaussian normal basis of small type. However, taking the computation of inverses into account-an operation that occurs in the derivation of a unique representation of a curve point-the situation seems to become more involved: In [1] an inversion circuit of depth O(n log n) involving O(n 2 log n) gates has been presented. Compared to the quadratic depth and cubic gate complexity of the best published inversion circuit using a polynomial basis [11] , this looks quite attractive. While [11] builds on Euclid's algorithm, [1] builds on a classical technique by Itoh and Tsujii [10] , which exploits that an efficient squaring algorithm is available. As mentioned, in the case of a Gaussian normal basis or a ghost-bit basis representation, the squaring operations in a quantum circuit are actually for free. To overcome the cubic gate complexity and quadratic depth requirements of inversion using a polynomial basis, the next section shows how to apply Itoh and Tsujii's algorithm with a polynomial basis.
Itoh-Tsujii inversion with a polynomial basis representation
Let α ∈ F 2 n be non-zero. As α −1 = α 2 n −2 , the inverse of α can be computed through exponentiation. Itoh and Tsujii proposed a particularly efficient method to compute this power (see [10, 23, 20, 8] ), if the squaring operation in F 2 n is inexpensive. The quantum circuits for inversion in [1] use exactly this technique when working with a field representation where squaring is just a permutation of the coefficient vector. Here we want to show that even with a polynomial basis, this approach is a very attractive alternative to Euclid's algorithm. To describe Itoh and Tsujii's approach, it is convenient to introduce some notation: for i ≥ 0 we define β i = α 2 i −1 . Then our goal is to find α −1 = (β n−1 ) 2 from β 1 = α. For this we exploit that
Itoh and Tsujii's strategy to find α −1 can be summarized in three steps:
(I) Repeatedly apply Equation (1) with i = j to find all of
Computing a value β i+j from given values β i , β j by means of Equation (1) involes one multiplication and an exponentiation by a fixed power of 2. As mentioned in Section 2.1, the multiplication can be implemented with n 2 Toffolis plus n 2 − 1 CNOT gates in a quantum circuit of depth O(n). Differing from the situation in [1] , the exponentiation with 2 i is not for free, but as the map ξ → ξ 2 i is F 2 -linear and bijective, we can implement it as a matrix-vector multiplication with a suitable non-singular n×n matrix having entries in F 2 . Thence, using an LUP-decomposition of this matrix, the needed exponentiation can be realized with n 2 + n CNOT gates in depth 2n. Summarizing, we see that in a polynomial basis representation, one evaluation of Equation (1) can be realized in depth O(n) using n 2 Toffolis and 2n 2 + n − 1 CNOT gates.
Step (I) in the above procedure requires ⌊log 2 (n − 1)⌋ − 1 evaluations of Equation (1), i. e., this step can be realized in depth O(n log 2 n) by means of (⌊log 2 (n − 1)⌋ − 1) · n 2 Toffolis and O(n 2 log n) CNOT gates. In Step (II), performing hw(n − 1) − 1 evaluations of Equation (1) sequentially, we obtain a depth of O(n log n), involving (hw(n − 1) − 1) · n 2 Toffolis and O(n 2 log n) CNOT gates.
Step (III) is just a matrix-vector multiplication with a suitable non-singular n × n matrix, and using an LUP-decomposition of the latter, a quantum circuit with no more than n 2 + n CNOT gates can realize this squaring in depth 2n.
To 'uncompute' ancilla, we run the complete circuit-with exception of the final squaring-'backwards' and obtain the following: Proposition 2.1. In a polynomial basis representation, α −1 , the inverse of an element α ∈ F 2 n , can be computed in depth O(n log 2 (n)) using 2 · (⌊log 2 (n − 1)⌋ + hw(n − 1) − 2) · n 2 = O(n 2 log n) Toffolis and O(n 2 log n) CNOT gates. This includes the cost for cleaning up ancillae.
Remark 2.1. Organizing the computation of β n−1 in
Step (II) in a tree structure, the circuit depth for this step can be reduced to O(n log log n), but because of Step (I), for the overall depth of the inverter we still obtain the bound O(n log 2 n).
Even though the squaring operation is not for free, in terms of T -gate complexity, this inverter seems quite competitive to the ones presented in [1] for ghost-bit and Gaussian normal basis representations. Thence, in the remainder of this paper we assume that a polynomial basis representation of the underlying field F 2 n is used.
Binary elliptic curves
Let n ∈ N be a positive integer and F 2 n a finite field of size 2 n . For cryptographic applications, typical values are n ∈ {163, 233, 283} [17] . Perhaps the most common representation of ordinary elliptic curves in characteristic 2 is a short Weierstrass form, given by a polynomial in F 2 n [x, y]:
Here a 2 , a 6 ∈ F 2 n , with a 6 = 0, and for practical purposes one often has a 2 ∈ {0, 1} (cf. [17] ). We write
for the (F 2 n -rational points on the) elliptic curve given by Equation (2). The point O ∈ E a 2 ,a 6 (F 2 n ) corresponds to the 'point at infinity.' 2 Because of a 6 = 0, we have (0, 0) ∈ E a 2 ,a 6 (F 2 n ), suggesting (0, 0) ∈ F 2 2 n 2 More technically, O is the unique point that is obtained when passing to the projective closure of Ea 2 ,a 6 .
as convenient representation of O. Hence, each curve point can be naturally represented as a pair of two field elements (which fit into 2n qubits). The elliptic curve E a 2 ,a 6 (F 2 n ) is equipped with a natural group structure, where O serves as the identity. Namely, for P 1 = (x 1 , y 1 ) and P 2 = (x 2 , y 2 ), their sum P 3 = P 1 + P 2 can be computed by the procedure in Figure 1 , which is taken from [22] .
Choosing a curve representation: the cost of adding a fixed point
Before looking at the task of implementing a general point addition P 1 + P 2 , it is worthwhile to consider the special case when P 1 = O = P 2 , P 1 = ±P 2 , and P 2 is a fixed point. In a discrete logarithm computation as discussed in [11, 13] , this is the only case needed, i. e., only the very last case of the addition law in Figure 1 needs to be taken into account. Still, when using affine coordinates, the addition law involves an inversion in F 2 n and as indicated by the discussion in Section 2, this inversion operation is typically (much) more expensive to implement than addition or multiplication in F 2 n . Therefore, relying on a projective formulation of the group law is a natural choice when designing quantum circuits. In projective coordinates, each (x, y) ∈ E a 2 ,a 6 (F 2 n ) \ {O} is represented by a triple (X, Y, Z) ∈ F 3 2 n such that X/Z = x and Y /Z = y, and O is represented by a triple (0, Y, 0) ∈ F 3 2 n with Y = 0. These triples are only unique up to multiplication with a non-zero element in F 2 n . Maslov et al. [13] exploit this freedom to restrict the number of of finite field inversion circuits in a discrete logarithm computation. In particular, they observe that as long as such a (non-unique) projective representation is sufficient, the addition of a constant curve point can be realized in linear depth.
To the best of our knowledge, no detailed (gate-level) analysis of how to add a fixed point on an elliptic curve has been published. Subsequently we note that-even with a clever implementation of projective coordinates-the T -gate complexity of such a quantum circuit can be reduced substantially by passing to a different curve representation. As a welcome aside, it seems that simultaneously the circuit depth can be brought down.
Mixed addition with projective coordinates
For the fixed point that is to be added, one can assume an affine representation is available leaving no need to handle a general 'Z-coordinate' for this operand. So using projective coordinates, a natural (non-trivial) way to implement the addition of a fixed point is to apply the madd-2008-bl formulae from [4] : with the curve parameter a 2 as in Equation (2) these formulae derive a projective representation (X 3 , Y 3 , Z 3 ) of P 1 + P 2 with twelve F 2 n -multiplications, three of them having one operand fixed (namely, one operand is x 2 , y 2 or a 2 ), seven F 2 n -additions, and one squaring.
Translating these formulae one by one immediately yields a quantum circuit in which the number of Toffolis, respectively T -gates, is determined by the nine general F 2 n -multiplications. To reduce the circuit depth, we can try to parallelize some of the computations. Adding some CNOT gates to create 'work copies' of intermediate results, we can enable parallelization without increasing the number of T -gates. To characterize the complexity of the resulting quantum circuit, we write D M (n) for the depth of an F 2 n -multiplier |α |β |ξ →|α |β |ξ + αβ , and G M (n) for the number of gates required to implement such a multiplier. Further, we write D T M (n) for the T -depth of an F 2 n -multiplier and G T M (n) for the number of T -gates required to implement such a multiplier. We assume that
, and G T M (n) include the cost for cleaning up ancillae. Squaring operations and multiplications with a non-zero constant can be implemented with no more than n 2 + n CNOT gates in depth 2n each. As a functional composition of squarings and multiplications by a non-zero constant can be combined into a single invertible F 2 -linear map (through matrix multiplication), any fixed functional composition of squarings and non-zero constant multiplications can be implemented in depth 2n with n 2 + n CNOT gates as well. 
is some projective representation of P 1 + P 2 and P 2 ∈ E a 2 ,a 6 (F 2 n ) a fixed point, represented with affine coordinates (x 2 , y 2 ).
Proof:
To implement the madd-2008-bl formulae we can proceed as follows:
1. Create a 'work copy' Z ′ 1 of Z 1 using n CNOT gates, all of which operate in parallel. Then compute Z 1 · y 2 and Z ′ 1 · x 2 in parallel and store these values in separate (| 0 -initialized) registers, using 2 · (n 2 + n) CNOT gates and depth 2n.
2. Using 2n CNOT gates, all operating in parallel, add Y 1 to Z 1 · y 2 and add X 1 to Z ′ 1 · x 2 , so that those registers now hold A and B respectively. Using 2n additional CNOT gates and increasing the circuit depth by 2, we can also store AB = A + B in a new (|0 -initialized) register. Moreover, using 2n CNOT gates, we can in constant depth provide 'work copies' A ′ of A and B ′ of B.
3. Using n 2 + n CNOT gates, we can now compute C = B 2 in depth 2n. If a 2 = 0, with no more than n 2 + n additional CNOT gates we can in parallel determine a 2 · (B ′ ) 2 .
4. Using four multiplication circuits that operate in parallel, we can now compute E = B · C, A · AB,
5. Next, using ≤ 2n CNOT gates that operate in parallel we can add
6. With three general F 2 n -multipliers we can now compute (
and store these values in new registers. For this, depth D M (n) and 3 · G M (n) gates suffice.
By adding
1 to E we obtain the value F in depth 1-involving n CNOT gates. Increasing the depth by 1 and adding n more CNOT gates, we can also create a 'work copy' F ′ of F .
8. Invoking two more multiplication circuits, we can obtain
, and this addition can be realized in depth 1 with n CNOT gates.
To clean up ancillae, the circuit is run backwards, excluding the final multiplications to compute
, and the final addition to compute Y 3 . This increases the overall depth by 3D M (n) plus 4n + O(1) (the latter accounting for CNOT gates), the T -depth by 3D T M (n), the gate count by an additional 6G M (n) plus 4n 2 + O(n) (the latter accounting for CNOT gates), and the T -gate count by 6G T M (n).
Mixed addition with a formula by Higuchi and Takagi
Building on earlier work by López and Dahab [12] , in [9] Higuchi and Takagi suggest a method to add points on an elliptic curve, which requires fewer multiplications than the madd-2008-bl formulae we just discussed. Again, we consider the case of a point addition P 1 +P 2 with P 1 = ±P 2 and P 1 = O = P 2 , where P 2 is fixed. Instead of the usual projective coordinates (X, Y, Z) with x = X/Z and y = Y /Z satisfying Equation (2), Higuchi and Takagi choose a projective representation with x = X/Z and y = Y /Z 2 . The corresponding projective formulation of Equation (2) then becomes
and the identity element O is represented by (X, 0, 0) ∈ F 3 2 n with X ∈ F * 2 n arbitrary. For adding a curve point P 1 represented in these coordinates by (X 1 , Y 1 , Z 1 ) ∈ F 3 2 n to a fixed curve point P 2 given by affine coordinates (x 2 , y 2 ) ∈ F 2 2 n , ten F 2 n -multiplications along with nine F 2 n -additions and three squarings suffice. In two of the ten multiplications one operand is constant:
Allowing an additional squaring, which does not affect the T -gate complexity, the formula for Y 3 can be rewritten as
This latter formulation is helpful in deriving a quantum circuit with fewer T -gates and a lower depth than the one in Proposition 3.1:
Proposition 3.2. The point addition
can be implemented in overall depth 4D M (n) plus 4n + O(1) (the latter being CNOT gates), and T -depth
Further, a total of 13G M (n) gates and 8n 2 + O(n) CNOT gates suffice. The total number of T -gates is 13G T M (n). This includes the cost for cleaning up ancillae. Here (X 3 , Y 3 , Z 3 ) is some projective representation of P 1 + P 2 as used by Higuchi and Takagi and P 2 a fixed curve point that is represented with affine coordinates (x 2 , y 2 ).
Proof: To implement the point addition formulae by Higuchi and Takagi we can proceed as follows:
1. Using 3n CNOT gates, in depth 2 we create 'work copies' X ′ 1 of X 1 as well as
2. With no more than 4 · (n 2 + n) CNOT gates, use the matrix-vector multiplications to compute A =
2 which can be performed in parallel in depth 2n. To be able to compute D 2 , using 2 · (n 2 + n) CNOT gates, we also compute in parallel
3. Using O(n) CNOT gates and constant depth we can now store 4. Now, using six general F 2 n -multipliers, we can in parallel compute G = F · C, 6. With two more multipliers that operate in parallel,
7. Finally, using O(n) CNOT gates and depth 2, with Equation (3) we can compute
To clean ancillae, we run the circuit backwards with the exception of the the final additions to compute Y 3 and X 3 and the multipliers to compute
. This increases the overall depth by 2D M (n) plus 2n + O(1) (the latter accounting for CNOT gates), the T -depth by 2D T M (n), the gate count by an additional 5G M (n) plus 6n 2 + O(n) (the latter accounting for CNOT gates), and the T -gate count by 5G T M (n). Comparing Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 3.2, we see that passing from the usual projective representation to the one used by Higuchi and Takagi results in a significant saving in the total number of gates and T -gates while reducing the circuit depth and T -depth. Thence, replacing the usual projective addition in the quadratic depth solution for the discrete logarithm problem in [13] with the addition discussed in this section is an attractive implementation option.
Implementing a general point addition using Edwards curves
In view of the case distinctions in the addition law in Figure 1 , implementing a quantum circuit that properly handles all cases of a point addition appears to be a somewhat burdensome task: in addition to the 'generic case' P 1 = ±P 2 (with P 2 not being fixed) and P 1 = O = P 2 , we have to implement a doubling formula (P 1 = P 2 ), making sure that the identity element is handled properly (P 1 = −P 2 , P 1 = O or P 2 = O). It is important to note here that testing the branching conditions in Figure 1 comes at a certain cost when working with inversion-free arithmetic as just discussed. With projective coordinates as described in Section 3.1.1, let (X 1 , Y 1 , Z 1 ) ∈ F 3 2 n and (X 2 , Y 2 , Z 2 ) ∈ F 3 2 n be representations of two curve points P 1 , P 2 different from the identity. Checking if these two points satisfy
requires two F 2 n -multiplications-not taking into account additional gates that may be needed to clean up ancillae.
Working with a different representation of elliptic curves offers an elegant alternative to dealing with the case distinctions in Figure 1 : In [5] , Bernstein et al. discuss a representation of ordinary elliptic curves over F 2 n which affords a complete addition law, i. e., the addition of any two curve points is handled with the very same formula. For n ≥ 3 (which is especially safe to assume in cryptographic applications), each ordinary elliptic curve is birationally equivalent to such a complete binary Edwards curve [5] . 
We will write E B,d 1 ,d 2 (F 2 n ) for the set of (F 2 n -rational) points on this curve.
The identity element of a complete binary Edwards curve is (0, 0) ∈ E B,d 1 ,d 2 (F 2 n ), and for any two points P 1 = (x 1 , y 1 ) and P 2 = (x 2 , y 2 ) in E B,d 1 ,d 2 (F 2 n ), their sum is P 3 = (x 3 , y 3 ) with
and
. Similar to working with a short Weierstrass form, one can pass to projective coordinates to avoid costly inversions. In [5] an explicit addition formula is given to compute a representation (X 3 , Y 3 , Z 3 ) of the sum of two points on a complete binary Edwards curve, represented projectively as (X 1 , Y 1 , Z 1 ) and (X 2 , Y 2 , Z 2 ). The formula involves 21 general multiplications in F 2 n , three multiplications by the parameter d 1 , one multiplication by the parameter d 2 , 15 additions of F 2 n -elements, and one squaring:
These formulae can be translated into a quantum circuit for adding arbitrary (variable) curve points:
The above circuit has depth 3D M (n)+2 max(D M (n), 2n)+O(1) with the argument 2n of max(·) as well as the O(1) originating in CNOT gates. The number of gates is bounded by 21G M (n) plus 4n 2 +O(n) CNOTs. 'Uncomputing' auxiliary qubits by running the circuit backwards-with the exception of the multiplications
, and the final additions to compute X 3 and Y 3 -yields the desired bound.
Making use of the (linear-depth and polynomial-size) multiplication circuits in [1] , for asymptotic purposes we obtain the following corollary from the above proposition. Proof: This follows immediately from the multiplier architectures described in [1] , which have linear depth and involve only a polynomial number of gates.
Conclusion
The circuits for binary elliptic curve arithmetic we have presented here are most likely not 'optimal' yet, but they give ample evidence that incorporating results from the classic elliptic curve literature in quantum circuit design is worthwhile: it is possible to bring down the number of gates and T -gates that need to be protected against errors and it is possible to reduce the overall circuit depth and T -depth. We hope that our results stimulate follow-up work on the design of efficient quantum circuits for elliptic curve arithmeticincluding the case of fields of odd characteristic. For adequately evaluting the cryptanalytic potential of quantum computers, this appears to be a fruitful and important research avenue.
